Table of Contents List of Tables List of Abbreviations 中文摘要(Abstract) CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Introduction 1.2 The Concept of Corporate Governance 1.3 Ownership Structure,Agency Theory,and Firm Per-formance CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL APROACH TO THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEBATE 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The Market-based Model:the UK and US 2.2.1 The Internal Mechanisms 1 Delegation and Agency Problem 2 Shareholder Democyracy Model:A Traditional Compa-ny Theory 3 Board Reform 2.2.2. The External Mechanisms 1 The Nexus of Contracts Model:Neo-economic Theory 2 The Theory of the Product and Labor Market 3 The Theory of the Market for Corporate Control 2.3 The Bank-based Model:Germany and Japan 2.3.1 Introduction 2.3.2 The Potential Monitoring Mechanisms 2.3.3 Banks As Owners and Creditors 2.3.4 Two-Tier Board and Codetermination 2.4 Conclusion CHAPTER 3 IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINESE LISTED COMPANIES:THE MARKET-BASED MODEL AND BANK-BASED MODEL 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The Market-based Model and Its Implications 3.2.1 Classical Socialism and Its Corporate Governance 3.2.2 The First Stage:From1984TO1993 3.2.3 The Second Stage:Since1994 3.2.4 The Product Market 3.2.5 The Stock Market 3.3 The Bank-based Model and Its Applications 3.3.1 Introduction 3.3.2 Controlling Insider Conerol 3.3.3 The Main Bank System Approach and Its Applica-tions 3.4 Conclusion CHAPTER4 THE STATE AS A LARGE SHAREHOLDER CHAPTER 5 INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS'ACTIVISM CHAPTER 6 THE POTENTIAL PAPTICIPANTS IN CHINA CHAPTER 7 THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE IN CHINESE LISTED COMPANIES CHAPTER 8 EXPROPRIATION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS BY CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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