Managerial market timing is the subject of an extensive body of literature（Baker and Wurgler，2002；Baker，Ruback，and Wurgler，2007；Warusawitharana and Whited，2015）.Baker and Wurgler（2002）suggest that corporate managers have incentives to time the market by exploiting（possibly perceived）misvaluations if they think it possible and if they care more about existing shareholders.Consistently，in their survey of 392 chief financial officers（CFOs）based in the U.S.and Canada，Graham and Harvey（2001）find that two-thirds of CFOs report that the amount by which their stock is misvalued is an important or very important consideration for equity issuance.Faced with misvaluations in the equity market，the literature suggests that managers’decision depends on the direction of the misvaluation.While overvaluation and the concentration of retail investors are associated with public offerings，undervaluation seems to be the main motivation for private placements.
1 Introduction 1．1 Literature review 1．2 Characteristics of the institutional environment for equity issues 1．3 Objectives of the dissertation 1．4 Main results and contributions 2 How can managers anticipate future stock overvaluation? 2．1 Introduction 2．2 Literature review 2．3 Sample selection and data 2．4 Stock price reactions to SEO announcements 2．5 Are SEO firms overvalued at the announcement? 2．6 Do managers successfully time the SEO market? 2．7 Summary 3 Market timing of seasoned equity offerings with long regulative process 3．1 Introduction 3．2 Literature review and hypotheses 3．3 Sample selection and data 3．4 Baseline results 3．5 Additional analyses 3．6 Further analyses 3．7 Summary 4 Market timing in private placements of seasoned equity 4．1 Introduction 4．2 The market timing hypothesis of private placements 4．3 Data and variables 4．4 Empirical results 4．5 Robustness check 4．6 Summary 5 Conclusion Bibliography Acknowledgements
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